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FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN FLORIDA:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
ALLISON J. RIGGS, ESQ.I
Laws that restrict individuals with felony convictions from voting are
widespread in the United States, but those laws themselves vary widely
from state to state. Only Maine and Vermont allow people who are
incarcerated for a felony to vote. Other states further prohibit individuals
on parole or probation relating to a felony conviction from casting a ballot.
The most stringent laws, that prohibit not only persons on probation and
parole from voting, but also those who have satisfied their entire sentence,
are found only in election states, including Florida. 2
Because of disparities in the criminal justice system, African Americans,
and other people of color are disproportionately more likely to be kept from
voting because of felony disenfranchisement laws. Indeed, in Florida, 23
percent of voting-age African Americans is disenfranchised because of
prior felony convictions. 3 Under Florida law, regaining the right to vote
following a felony conviction is exceptionally difficult. This article
examines the fluctuating rules governing restoration of the right to vote in
Florida, including legal challenges to those rules. This article concludes by
discussing potential legal, policy, and advocacy routes for ameliorating the
enormous burden that these rules place on people of color seeking to
participate in the political process.
I. EVOLVING FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT RULES IN FLORIDA
The United States is unique amongst developed nations in its sanctioning
of stringent felony disenfranchisement. 4 Florida is unique amongst the
I Ms. Riggs received her J.D. in 2009 from the University of Florida. She is currently a Senior
Attorney at the Southern Coalition for Social Justice in Durham, North Carolina, where she specializes
in voting rights.
2 Marla McDaniel et al., Imprisonment and Disenfranchisement of Disconnected Low-Income Men,
URBAN INSTITUTE, 4 (August 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412986-
Imprisonment-and-Disenfranchisement-of-Disconnected-Low-Income-Men.pdf.
3 Id. at 5-6.
4 The Canadian Supreme Court held that criminal disenfranchisement laws are unconstitutional.
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states in the stringency of its felony disenfranchisement, which leaves those
convicted of a felony conviction permanently disenfranchised, absent
affirmative action on the person with the conviction to seek restoration of
the right to vote.5 Although this practice has been a prominent
characteristic of Florida criminal justice policy for many years, Florida,
unlike most states, has moved to make these laws more restrictive in the
last several years. That trend has had a significant detrimental impact on
the state's electorate, with noticeable racial disparities. The fluctuation of
the rules governing the restoration of civil rights in Florida only
exacerbates the burdens on those formerly involved in the criminal justice
system.
1. Origin of Felony Disenfranchisement in Florida
Disenfranchisement of individuals with felony convictions dates back to
Florida's first constitution in 1838, which stated, "The General Assembly
shall have the power to exclude from.. .suffrage, all persons convicted of
bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crime, or misdemeanor." 6 This
provision remained essentially unchanged in Florida's 1861 and 1865
Constitutions. 7 However, the provision was significantly amended in the
state's 1868 constitutional convention. It was changed to say, "nor shall
any person convicted of a felony be qualified to vote at any election unless
restored to civil rights. . .The legislature shall have power and shall enact
the necessary laws to exclude from... suffrage, all persons convicted of
bribery, perjury, larceny or of infamous crime." 8 That provision remained
unchanged until the 1968 constitutional convention. The language was
then amended to state that "[n]o person convicted of a felony, or
adjudicated in this or any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be
qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of
disability." 9
Suav6 v. Canada, [20021 3 S.C.R. 519, para. 7 (Can.). The European Court of Human Rights found that
denying offenders serving more than a one-year sentence was a violation of the European Convention
on Human Rights. See Frodl v. Austria, App. No. 20201/04, Eur. H.R. Rep. (2010). It also declared that
blanket criminal disenfranchisement laws are illegal. See also Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-
IX Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
5 FLA. CONST. art. 6, § 4 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 4, 2014, General Election).
6 FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 13 (amended 1868).
7 FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 9 (1968).
8 FLA. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 2, 4 (amended 1968).
9 FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (1968).
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2. Changing Felony Disenfranchisement Rules in Florida
Even after the last constitutional revision, Floridians were subjected to
many changes in the application of the felony disenfranchisement
constitutional provision. In 1974, the Florida legislature passed the
Correctional Reform Act,10 declaring that "[e]ffective July 1, 1974, upon
conviction of a felony, the civil rights of a person convicted shall be
suspended until he is discharged from parole or released from the custody
of the department without parole, at which time such civil rights are
automatically reinstated." The governor at the time, Ruben Askew,
immediately sought an advisory opinion on the legislation from the Florida
Supreme Court. The court found that this portion of the Act-automatic
reinstatement of civil rights-unconstitutionally infringed upon the
constitutional power of the Governor (with the approval of three members
of the Cabinet) to restore civil rights.l' Thus, this early legislative attempt
to minimize the long-term effects of felony disenfranchisement failed.
Following the Florida Supreme Court's ruling, the Governor and the
Cabinet in 1975 established the Rules of Executive Clemency, thereby
creating the Office of Executive Clemency to process matters of executive
clemency.12 However, in an attempt to further the legislative intent of the
invalidated part of the Correctional Reform Act, the Governor and three
members of the Cabinet (together, the Board of Executive Clemency)
implemented written rules under which certain categories of executive
clemency cases would be eligible for automatic restoration of civil rights.13
From 1975 until 1991, the restoration of civil rights in Florida was
automatic, although it was still necessary to apply and prove eligibility. 14 In
1991, the state began requiring a hearing before civil rights could be
restored.15 In 1999, the number of applicant criminal offenses that required
a hearing before the applicant could have his or her right to vote restored
was expanded to include about 200 crimes. 16  Governor Jeb Bush,
however, shortened that list of offenses when media reports revealed
10 FLA. STAT. § 944.292 (1974).
11 In re Advisory of the Governor Civil Rights, 306 So. 2d 520, 524 (Fla. 1975).
12 FLA. PAROLE COMM'N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 14, available at
https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/reports/FCORannualreport2O1213.pdf.
13 FLA. PAROLE COMM'N, RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS' (RCR) CASES GRANTED 2009 AND
2010 4-5, available at bttps://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/reports/2009-201 OClemencyReport.pdf.
14 Margaret Colgate Love, NACDL Restoration of Rights Resource Project, July 2013 at 3,
available at
https://www.nacdl.org/uploadedFiles/files/resourcecenter/2012_restorationprojectstate narr-fl.pdf.
15 Id. at 3.
16 Id.
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enormous delays in the restoration process. 17
In 2004, Governor Bush also established the Governor's Ex-Offender
Task Force to assess the effectiveness of the state in reintegrating those
involved in the criminal justice system. By the end of 2006, the Task Force
concluded that successful re-integration was critical to reducing
recidivism.1 8 In addition, the Task Force recommended further study on
"the loss of civil rights upon conviction of a felony, [... ] with the aim of
additional reform recommendations' [.]"19
In 2006, Florida Republican Charlie Crist's campaign promised to
streamline the rights restoration process and improve the ability of
formerly-incarcerated persons to vote and obtain professional licenses.2 0 In
April of 2007, Governor Crist, with the support of two of his three Cabinet
members, revised and streamlined the rules governing the restoration of
civil rights.21 For many of those convicted of non-violent offenses, no
affirmative action or petitioning would be required of them any longer.22
Instead, the Florida Parole Commission would send a list of eligible
persons who had completed their sentence to the Office of Executive
Clemency.2 3 Individuals on that list would have their civil rights restored
without a hearing or investigation. 24 However, despite the improvement
that these changes created, the new rules still fell short of the "automatic"
restoration of rights promised during the campaign. 25 Restoration of civil
rights still required the approval of the Clemency Board, requiring time and
processing. 26 Those persons eligible for "automatic" restoration still found
17 Debbie Cenziper & Jason Grotto, Violent Offenders Rights Restored While Lesser Offenders
Wait, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 21, 2004), available at http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/1285619/posts.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1000998163/F037CAFD824747F3PQ/2?accountid= 14068.
18 Bryan Miller & Joseph Spillane, Civil Death: An Examination of Ex-felon Disenfranchisement
and Reintegration, PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY, 14(4): 402-28, available at
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/258181096_CivildeathAn-examination-of-ex-
felon disenfranchisement and reintegration.
19
-Id. at 405.
20 Farhad Manjoo, What Was Charlie Crist Thinking? SALON (April 6, 2007), available at
http://www.salon.com/2007/04/06/crist_10/
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See Bryan Miller & Joseph Spillane, Governing the restoration of civil rights for ex-felons: an
evaluation of the Executive Clemency Board in Florida," CONTEMP. JUST. REV. Aug. 8, 2012, at 1, 2
available at
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/263729991_Governingthe_restoration-of civil-rightsfor ex
-felons an evaluation-of theExecutiveClemencyBoard inFlorida.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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themselves caught in a backlog of paperwork in Tallahassee. 27
In March of 2011, at the first Board of Executive Clemency meeting
after Governor Rick Scott was elected, the Board voted unanimously to
revise and pass more restrictive the rules governing the restoration of civil
rights. 28 Under Scott, the Board of Executive Clemency promulgated Rules
9 and 10 of the Rules of Clemency, which provided for two levels of
eligibility for restoration of civil rights.29 Applicants convicted of more
serious felonies are now required to wait seven years after the completion
of their sentence, and must undergo a full investigation and hearing before
the Board. 30 Applicants who fall into the category of less serious offenses
must wait five years after the completion of their sentence before applying
for the restoration of their rights, but they may be able avoid a hearing. 31
Any applicant whose request for restoration of civil rights is denied must
wait two years before applying again.32 Because the Board of Executive
Clemency meets only quarterly in Tallahassee, an applicant who falls into
the Rule 10 category may wait years for a hearing. 33
The legislature in 2011 enacted a "decoupling" law, which prohibited
licensing boards in the state from denying licenses based solely on the fact
that the applicant for the license had not had his or her civil rights
restored. 34 Agencies are not, however, prohibited from taking the lack of
restoration of civil rights into account in making licensure decisions. 35
II. EFFECT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN FLORIDA
The effect of Florida's draconian felony disenfranchisement rules on its
citizens and voters is jaw-dropping, especially when compared to the rest
of the country. As of 2010, according to the most recent data available,
over 1.5 million Floridians are prohibited from voting because of past
felony convictions. 36 That number is increased from the approximately 1.1
27 Id. at 4.
28 id. at 2.
29 Id.; See Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 9-10; See also Reginald R. Garcia, Esq., Florida Executive
Clemency: Seeking Mercy and Justice for Convicted Felons, FLORIDA DEFENDER (May 2011),
available at http://www.floridaclemencyattomey.com/documents/FIDefender_201 1_May.pdf.
30 Miller & Spillane, supra note 23 at 11; Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 10(A).
31 Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 9(A).
32 Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 14.
33 Miller & Spillane, supra note 23 at 2.
34 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.01(c) (repealed 2013).
35 FLA. STAT. § 112.01(2) (repealed 2013).
36 Christopher Uggen, Sarah Shannon, & Jeff Manza, State-level Estimates of Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (July 2012) at 16, available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fdStateLevelEstimates-ofFelonDisen2010.pdf.
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million Floridians disenfranchised in 2004.37 Of those 1.5 million
disenfranchised in 2010, over 1.3 million have been released from prison or
jail and have completed all probation and parole. 38 Given that there were
14.8 million people eligible to vote in Florida in 2010, this means that over
10% of Floridians above the age of 18 were denied their constitutional right
to vote.39  In the entire United States, 5.85 million citizens are
disenfranchised, meaning that over 26% of the country's disenfranchised
live in the state of Florida.40
The effect on African-American Floridians is even more disheartening.
In 2010, over a half a million African Americans were disenfranchised,
constituting 23.32% of the state's African-American voting age population.
Of those disenfranchised, over 83% had completed their sentences.41 The
disparity is undeniable. While one out of ten Floridians are
disenfranchised, nearly one of four black Floridians are denied the right to
vote. 42
Felony disenfranchisement laws generally also have an effect on
recidivism rates. A seminal study has indicated that there is a statistically
significant relationship between voting and the likelihood of recidivism
following a felony conviction. The study found that "among former
arrestees, about 27 percent of the nonvoters were rearrested, relative to 12
percent of the voters." 43 Thus, while many supporters of felony
disenfranchisement justify those laws as demanding proof of rehabilitation
prior to the restoration of the right to vote, that logic is flatly backward.
Beyond just the impact of these laws by demographic, the voting rights
restoration process is "[... ] an exhausting, emotionally draining process
[ ... ] "44 that undoubtedly has a huge psychological effect on those willing
to brave that route. During Governor Bush's administration, restoration of
civil rights applications faced a rejection rate of 85%.45 In the late 2000s,
37 Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 248 (Oxford (2006); Ryan S. King, State Felony Disenfranchisement Reform, 1997-2008,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT (September 2008) at 9, available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fdstatedisenfranchisement.pdf.
38 Uggen, Shannon & Manza, supra note 36, at 14.
39 Id. at 16.
40 Manza & Uggen, supra note 37.
41 Id. at 17.
42 Uggen, Shannon & Manza, supra note 36, at 15-17.
43 Manza & Uggen, supra note 37 at 70.
44 Thomas B. Pfankuch, Clemency Board very cautious in restoring rights, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION
(June 3, 2001), at 1 (quoting Governor Bush), available at http://jacksonville.com/tu-
online/stories/060301/met_6339439.html#.VXtRAWBtNUQ.
45 Ted Chiricos et al., Racial Threat and Opposition to the Re-Enfranchisement of Ex-Felons, 1
INT'L J. CRIM. & SOCIOLOGY 13, 17 (2012), available at
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more than 60% of the applications were summarily rejected, most often
because of outstanding victim restitution or court fees. 46
The effect of Florida's frequently-in-flux restoration rules can further be
understood by looking at the number of people restored to full civil rights
in recent years. In 2009-2010, 30,672 Floridians regained the right to vote
via the restoration of civil rights.47 In 2010-2011, 5,771 Floridians were
granted a restoration of civil rights.48 After the change to the rules made by
the Scott administration, the number of restorations completed in 2011-
2012 dropped precipitously, with only 420 Floridians regaining the right to
vote in that year.49 The Tampa Bay Times reported in June of 2011 that
there were more than 95,000 applications for clemency pending before the
Board of Executive Clemency. 50 That backlog was dramatically reduced
after the vast majority of those were ruled ineligible because of the newly-
mandated waiting period.51
Finally, Florida's felony disenfranchisement laws have a political effect
as well, which is best highlighted by the 2000 Presidential election. In
Florida, the presidential race was decided by a 537-vote margin, at a time
when approximately 600,000 former offenders were prohibited from voting
in the state. 52 Indeed, one study indicated that as many as seven U.S.
Senatorial elections would have had a different outcome absent felony
disenfranchisement laws. 53 In light of this, the unavoidable political effect
on lower turnout elections is certainly not difficult to appreciate.
III. CHALLENGES TO FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN FLORIDA
Opponents of felony disenfranchisement laws have employed a number
of legal strategies to invalidate those laws, but legal challenges to felony
disenfranchisement laws across the country have not been particularly
successful. The United States Supreme Court first heard a Fourteenth
http://www.lifescienceglobal.com/home/cart?view=product&id= 184.
46 Id.
47 Margaret Colgate Love, NACDL Restoration of Rights Resource Project (July 2013) FL1,at FL3,
available at
https://www.naedl.org/uploadedFiles/files/resourcecenter/2012_restorationproject/state-narr-fl.pdf.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Michael Bender, Citrus County Electrician Gets Gov. Rick Scott's First Pardon, TAMPA BAY
TIMES, June 2, 2011, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/gubematorial/citrus-county-
electrician-gets-gov-rick-scotts-first-full-pardon/l 173320.
51 Love, supra note 47.
52 George Brooks, Comment, Felony Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy and Politics, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851 (2005).
53 Manza & Uggen, supra note 37.
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Amendment challenge to such a law in Richard v. Ramirez in 1974.54 In
Ramirez, the Court rejected Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment challenge,
relying on an exception in Section 2 of the Equal Protection Clause that
allows states to abridge the right to vote because of "participation in
rebellion, or other crime." 55 Asserting the inconsistent logic that one part of
the Equal Protection Clause prohibited a practice that another part of the
Clause expressly endorsed, the Court thus concluded that felony
disenfranchisement was as least facially constitutional. 56
In 1985, however, opponents of felony disenfranchisement laws did
succeed in convincing the Court that those laws could be intentionally
discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Hunter v.
Underwood,5 7 the Supreme Court invalidated an Alabama felony
disenfranchisement law where a substantial amount of evidence indicated
that the law was passed in order to discriminate against black voters. 58
Thus far, Hunter has been the only exception to the Ramirez.
More recently, voting rights litigators have tried to attack felony
disenfranchisement laws under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In
1982, Congress revised Section 2, creating a "results" test that made clear
that discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish a violation of Section
2. Under the 1982 Amendment, a violation of Section 2 is established
when, in the "totality of circumstances," the impact of a challenged voting
practice is discriminatory. To date, the three Circuit Courts of Appeals that
have considered Section 2 challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws
have all rejected the application of Section 2 to such laws.59 Given the
absence of a circuit split, the Supreme Court has yet to take up the issue,
and voting rights litigators seem to be declining to pursue such challenges.
Challenges mounted against Florida's particularly stringent felony
disenfranchisement laws have not been more successful than challenges in
less restrictive states. The first devastating blow to opponents of felony
disenfranchisement was delivered in Beacham v. Braterman.60 In Beacham,
54 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
55 Id. at 43.
56 Id. at 55.
57 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
58 Id. at 233.
59 Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.
2010); Johnson v. Governor of State of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (1 1th Cir. 2005). The Sixth Circuit
"assumed" that Section 2 would apply to a felony disenfranchisement law, but found that there was no
discriminatory effect resulting from Tennessee's law; Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1259-61 (6th
Cir. 1986).
60 Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, (S.D. Fla.) aff'd, 396 U.S. 12, 90 S. Ct. 153, 24 L.Ed.
2d 11 (1969).
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which was decided before Richardson v. Ramirez, the U.S. Supreme Court
summarily affirmed a trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's class action
lawsuit challenging Florida's felony disfranchisement law. The lower court
rejected Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, based
almost entirely on the reasoning that the denial of voting rights following a
felony conviction is a longstanding and quite common practice. 61 That
court also flatly rejected the allegation that the Plaintiffs' due process rights
were violated by the vesting of the power for the Governor of Florida, with
the approval of three members of the Cabinet, to restore the right to vote to
some people with felony convictions and not to others. The court stated,
"[t]he restoration of civil rights is part of the pardon power and as such is
an act of executive clemency not subject to judicial control." 62 In a per
curiam decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling.63
But Beacham was not the last challenge to Florida's felony
disenfranchisement law. In 2001, acting on behalf of all Floridians
convicted of a felony who have completed their sentences but remain
ineligible to vote, eight plaintiffs filed a lawsuit challenging Florida's
felony disenfranchisement law under the First, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and under the Voting Rights Act. 64 The
District Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs'
Fourteenth Amendment claim. It concluded that the Supreme Court's
decisions in Ramirez and the same District Court in Beacham (which
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court) precluded such a claim. Like
the Court in Richardson, the District Court reiterated that Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment expressly sanctioned such an action. 65 The Court
likewise rejected Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim.
The District Court in Johnson granted Defendant's summary judgment
on Plaintiffs' intentional discrimination claims even though Plaintiffs had
presented substantial evidence that the challenged provision was initially
motivated by improper intent. The court concluded, however, that re-
enactment of the law in 1968, without any proven discriminatory intent,
relieved the state of any liability for the discriminatory origins of the law. 66
61 Id. at 184.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1337-38 (S.D. Fla. 2002) affd in part, rev'd in part and
remanded sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287 (1 1th Cir. 2003) reh'g en banc
granted, opinion vacated sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 377 F.3d 1163 (1 1th Cir. 2004) and
aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of State of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (1 lth Cir. 2005)
66 Id. at 1337; See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974); See also Beachman v.
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With regard to Plaintiffs' claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, the court found that no Section 2 violation could occur where racially-
neutral factors caused the disparate impact on minority voters.67 Essentially
dismissing the role of bias in the criminal justice system, the court held that
the African-American Plaintiffs were not deprived of the right to vote
because of any immutable characteristic they possessed, but rather because
they committed criminal acts. 68 Finally, Plaintiffs alleged that the
requirement that disenfranchised ex-offenders needed to have paid all
victim restitution in order to be eligible for restoration of civil rights was an
impermissible poll tax. 69  The court rejected this claim because
impermissible poll taxes directly burden the right to vote, and Plaintiffs had
no right to vote (because the state had deprived them of it).70
When appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, a three-judge panel affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment on the poll tax claim, but
reversed the grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs' equal protection and
Voting Rights Act claims because there were disputed issues of fact.7' The
panel concluded, quite differently than the district court, that the
"discriminatory purpose behind Florida's felon disenfranchisement
provision establishes an equal protection violation that persists with the
provision unless it is subsequently reenacted on the basis of an
independent, non-discriminatory purpose." 72
With regard to the Section 2 claims, the appellate panel rejected the
district court's interpretation of the Act. The court noted that the
conclusion that the disparate impact is caused by felon's poor decision-
making begs the statutorily mandated question: "whether felon status
interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives." 73 Specifically, the panel found that "racial bias in the
criminal justice system may very well interact with voter disqualifications
to create the kind of barriers to political participation on account of race
that are prohibited by Section 2. Thus, rendering it simply another relevant
Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 192 (S.D Fla. 1969) aff d, 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
67 Id. at 1341.
68 Id. at 1341-42.
69 Id. at 1342.
70 Id. at 1343.
71 Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287 (11 th Cir. 2003) reh'g en bane granted,
opinion vacated sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 377 F.3d 1163 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
72 Id. at 1301.
73 Id. at 1305 (internal quotations omitted).
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social and historical condition to consider where appropriate." 74
The state obtained en banc review from the Eleventh Circuit, which
vacated the panel's judgment and affirmed in its entirety the ruling by the
District Court. 75 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that in fact there was no
evidence that the original 1868 constitutional disenfranchising provision
was motivated by racial animus. 76 And even had the appeals court been
satisfied that Plaintiffs had proven racial animus motivating the 1868
provision, it agreed with the district court that such improper motivation
would not condemn the 1968 constitutional provision.77 The appeals court
also held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act could not be
constitutionally read to apply to felony disenfranchisement laws because
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly endorsed such laws. 78
Plaintiffs sought review by the United States Supreme Court, but the
Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. 79 As such, the Eleventh
Circuit ruling stands today as binding precedent, creating an inhospitable
environment for facial challenges to Florida's felony disenfranchisement
law. However, this reality does not mean all litigation solutions are off the
table, and certainly does not mean that Floridians cannot obtain substantial
relief through legislative and advocacy efforts.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR STRATEGIES TO AMELIORATE THE
DEVASTATING IMPACT OF FLORIDA'S FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT RULES
As long as Florida, and indeed most of America, views exclusion from
the political process as an acceptable or "traditional" punishment for
criminal violations, citizens will be burdened and restricted from voting
because of felony disenfranchisement law. But the failure of earlier legal
challenges does not doom the effort as a whole. By adopting a multi-
faceted approach to ameliorating the impact of Florida's felony
disenfranchisement laws-including legislative, advocacy and litigation
strategies-the situation facing an enormous number of Florida voters can
be improved. Three such options are presented below.
74 Id. at 1306 (citing Farrakhan v. Locke, No. 96-0076, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212 (E.D. Wash.
2000) ("Farrakhan II").
75 Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214, 1214 (11th Cir. 2005).
76 Id. at 1219.
77 Id. at 1225-26.
78 Id. at 1233-34.
79 Johnson v. Bush, 546 U.S. 1015, 126 S. Ct. 650, 651, 163 L. Ed. 2d 526 (2005).
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1. Criminal Justice Reform
Perhaps the most important, and least intuitive for voting rights litigators
and advocates, solution is reducing the opportunity for Florida's felony
disenfranchisement rules to apply to its citizens in the first place. Florida's
criminal code is particularly harsh, and as of 2009, Florida had the highest
rate among all states of current and estimated former felons as a percent of
the adult population-over 14%.80
Florida's drug laws are an enormous contributor to the number of its
citizens who are prohibited from participating in the political process. A
2009 state-by-state analysis indicated that Florida more severely and more
routinely punishes minor marijuana crimes than any other state. And that
situation is unlikely to change, because in recent years, state legislators
have elected to enhance Florida's criminal punishments each time
they revisited the state's marijuana penalties 81
Looking at what specifically constitutes a felony with regard to
marijuana is enlightening and frustrating. Possession alone of more than
20 grams of marijuana is a felony punishable by a maximum sentence of 5
years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $5,000.82 Possession of fewer
than 25 plants-including the possession of just a single marijuana plant-
is a felony punishable by a maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment
and a maximum fine of $5,000.83 The sale of more than 20 grams but less
than 25 lbs. or less is a felony punishable by a maximum sentence of 5
years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $5,000.84 Sale or delivery
within 1,000 feet of a school, college, park, or other specified areas is a
felony punishable by a maximum sentence of 15 years imprisonment and a
maximum fine of $10,000.85
Hashish and other such concentrates are considered schedule I narcotics
in Florida. 86 Possession of hashish or concentrates is a felony in the third
degree. 87 Possessing more than 3 grams of hash, selling, manufacturing,
delivering, or possessing with intent to sell, manufacture or deliver, hashish
or concentrates is also a third-degree felony. Moreover, the offense is
80 Sarah Shannon et al., Growth in the U.S. Ex-Felon and Ex-Prisoner Population, 1948-2010,
POPULATION ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (Arp. 18, 2011), http://paa2Ol.princeton.edu/papers/111687.
81 Paul Armentano, The 5 Worst States to Get Busted With Pot, ALTERNET (May 13, 2011),
available at http://www.alternet.org/story/150935/the_5_worststates-to-get busted-with-pot.
82 FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(e), 775.083(1)(c), See 893.13(6) (2014).
83 FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(e), 775.083(1)(c), See 893.13(6), 893.135(1)(a) (2014).
84 FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(e), 775.083(1)(c), See 893.13(1)(a)(2), 893.135(1)(a) (2014).
85 FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(3)(d), 775.083(1)(b), 893.03(1)(c), 893.13(1)(c) (2014).
86 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.03(1)(c) (West 2014).
87 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1)(a)(2) (West 2014).
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charged as a second-degree felony if the offense occurred within 1,000 feet
of a child care facility between 6 A.M. and 12 midnight, a park or
community center, a college, university or other postsecondary educational
institute, any church or place of worship that conducts religious activities,
any convenience business, public housing, or an assisted living facility. 88
Of course, drug laws are not the only part of the Florida criminal justice
system that imposes felony sentences and potential lifetime
disenfranchisement for absurdly minor offenses. For example, in Florida,
any property taken that carries a value of more than $300 can be considered
grand theft in certain circumstances, which is classified as a third-degree
felony. 89 In one case, a couple was convicted of felonious grand theft for
stealing razors from a store.90 In some circumstances, "removing a
shopping cart, with intent to deprive the merchant of possession, use,
benefit, or full retail value" can constitute a third-degree felony. 91 The idea
that a person might be disenfranchised for life for stealing razors or
absconding with a shopping cart should should offend the sensibilities of
anyone considering the collateral consequences of a criminal justice system
with such stiff sentencing structures.
Until politicians and the general public start appreciating the connection
between voting rights and criminal justice policy, hundreds of thousands of
Floridians will be face a lifetime of exclusion from the political process.
Opponents of felony disenfranchisement have the opportunity to make
important strides in the advocacy realm by encouraging dialogue about
how the over-criminalization of Florida society creates absurd results,
particularly in the voting rights arena.
2. Statewide Constitutional Initiative
Florida is uniquely situated because its citizens are empowered to amend
their state constitution fairly easily and directly through the initiative
process. The initiative process is a mechanism that has been utilized to
protect voting rights in the past, and could be used now to ease the effects
of Florida's felony disenfranchisement rules.
Florida voters can use the constitutional initiative process by gathering
petitions signed by a number of voters equal to eight percent of votes cast
in the last presidential election. Those signed petitions are not required
88 Id.
89 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.014(2)(c)(1) (West 2014).
90 Rimondi v. State, 89 So. 3d 1059, 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
91 FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 812.015 (West 2012) (effective July 1, 2012).
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simply on a statewide basis-they must come from at least one half of the
state's congressional districts. To begin the initiative petition process, an
individual or group, wishing to propose an amendment must register as a
political committee with the Division of Elections.9 2 The political
committee is then required to submit the proposed initiative amendment
petition form to the Division of Elections. Then, the petitions are circulated
for signatures. The division only reviews the initiative petition form for
sufficiency of its format.93
The political committee must pay the Supervisor of Elections for each
signature that the Supervisor's office checks, which is either ten cents or
the actual cost of checking the signature (whichever is less). The
sponsoring political committee pays that fee at the time of submitting the
petitions. If the political committee cannot pay for the signature-checking
without creating an undue burden on the organization, the organization can
seek to have those charges waived by submitting a written certification of
that inability to pay. However, if the committee pays any person to solicit
signatures, an undue burden affidavit may not be filed in lieu of paying the
verification fee. 94
Once a political committee secures signatures from 10% of the voters
required, from at least 25% of the congressional districts, the Division of
Elections will send the petition to the Attorney General. The Attorney
General then, within thirty days of receipt of that petition, must request
from the Supreme Court an advisory opinion regarding the compliance of
the text of proposed amendment with Art. XI, Section 3, of the State
Constitution and the compliance of the proposed ballot title and summary
with Section 101.161 of the Florida Statutes.
The process does not end there, though. Any constitutional amendment
brought through the citizen initiative process needs 60% of the vote to
pass. 95 The cost of such direct democracy is substantial as well-recent
examples attest to that. As of October 2010, the Fair Districts Florida
campaign to establish constitutional criteria for redistricting had raised 6.9
million dollars to ensure the petition requirements were met and the
electorate was educated on the amendments before voting on them.9 6 The
Floridians for Youth Tobacco Education, Inc. citizen initiative campaign
92 FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 9. 106.03 (West 2013) (effective Nov. 1, 2013).
93 See FLA. CODE § 1S-2.009 (effective: May 21, 2014).
94 See FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 106.191 (West 2014).
95 FLA. CONST. art. 11 § 3.
96 See Campaign Finance Activity, FLORIDA DEPT. OF STATE, DIVISION OF ELECTION,
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/committees/ComDetail.asp?account-43605 (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
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recently spent over $5.3 million to ensure that the legislature was forced to
use tobacco lawsuit settlement money to fund a statewide tobacco
education and prevention program.97
Despite the cost and procedural hurdles for pursuing a legislative
solution to the felony disenfranchisement problem, the current state of
public opinion on felony disenfranchisement laws is encouraging, which
makes direct democracy quite appealing. Recent public polling efforts
indicate that approximately 80% of those polled (and the polls embrace a
variety of methodologies) believe that disenfranchisement should end after
an individual with a felony conviction completes his or her sentence,
including parole and probation. 98
Fortunately, the effort to utilize this strategy is already underway. A
proposed measure that would amend Section 4 of Article VI of the Florida
Constitution has already reached the stage where signatures are being
collected. The language of the proposed amendment would add the
underlined text:
Article VI, Section 4. Disqualifications-
No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state
to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until
restoration of civil rights or removal of disability. Except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, any disqualification from voting arising from
a felony conviction shall terminate and voting rights shall be restored upon
completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation.
No person convicted of murder or a felony sexual offense shall be
qualified to vote until restoration of civil rights. 99
Based on prior election results, supporters will need to collect a
minimum of 683,149 valid signatures by February 1, 2016, in order to
qualify the measure for the November 2016 ballot. 100
While the financial and procedural burdens of pursuing a constitutional
amendment to revise Florida's felony disenfranchisement laws may seem
daunting, the benefits may be equally large. Firstly, this strategy bypasses
the courts and legislature that historically have been unfriendly to re-
enfranchisement efforts. Secondly, such a campaign would create an
opportunity for grassroots organization on a large scale, and would
97 Curry, Christopher, Tobacco suit amendment on the ballot, OCALA STAR BANNER, available at
http://www.ocala.com/article/20061010/NEWS/210100333 (last updated Oct. 10, 2006, 12:00 AM).
98 Chiricos, supra note 45, at 16.
99 FLA. CONST., art. VI, § 4 (West 2014).
100 See Collecting Signatures, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Lawsgovemingtheinitiativeprocess_inFlorida#Collecting signatures (last
visited Mar. 1,2015).
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facilitate public dialogue about the right to vote being worthy of
constitutional protections. That type of conversation would likely have
ancillary benefits in the broader voting rights struggle because one of the
field's greatest challenges has been convincing the general public that
voting is a right, not a privilege.
3. Strategic Litigation
Facial challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws brought under the
Constitution or the Voting Rights Act have been minimally successful.
While certainly not a novel suggestion, the use of strategic litigation
bringing as-applied challenges to these laws has a strong appeal as part of a
multi-pronged strategy in the overall effort to re-enfranchise Floridians
who have had been involved in the criminal justice system.101 And while
this strategy has long been contemplated, its effectuation has been absent or
excruciatingly slow in most instances.
A 2002 Harvard Law Review article recommended the use of strategic
litigation, aiming at undermining felony disenfranchisement laws in small
ways, particularly given the minimal success litigators have had in
obtaining judicial invalidations of state disenfranchisement laws. 102
Certainly no one could argue that Richardson read in light of Hunter
precludes all challenges to the administration of a state's clemency or
restoration of civil rights process if that process can be shown to
discriminate on the basis of race.
The Harvard Law article suggested two particular avenues of targeted
attack.103 First, the article recommended challenges to the choice of
disqualifying crime, arguing that "Richardson did not address directly
whether a state might choose among disqualifying crimes in a way that
violates the Constitution."104 Such an approach seems more suited to states
that still attach disenfranchisement to the commission of "infamous" crimes
(i.e., it is unclear exactly what crimes are disqualifying), but the arbitrary
classification of felonies in Florida could provide some opportunity to test
this strategy. Second, the article pointed to susceptibility of restoration
conditions to constitutional and Voting Rights Act challenges.105
Particularly in Florida, challenges might be promising where restoration is
101 See IV One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HAR. L. REv. 1939,
1959 (2002).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
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granted on arbitrary basis, or where the restoration process is so long or so
opaque as to constitute a due process violation. Given the judiciary's
resistance to striking down felony disenfranchisement laws on their face,
the article astutely noted that "[r]estricting the manner in which a state
restores a felon's voting rights does not limit that state's power to take
away the right to vote." 106
So why have such targeted litigations efforts failed to materialize? In
Florida, the lack of transparency with which the clemency process operates,
along with the failure of the Board to offer reasons for its actions, certainly
hamstrings the ability of challengers to mount an attack. For example, the
Office of Executive Clemency refuses to release racial data on the
restoration of civil rights applications it receives, despite such data being
requested by the application form itself.107 Often times, during clemency
hearings, the Governor announces that restoration of civil rights application
is denied without any explanation to the public viewing those hearings. 108
A first step in creating an environment more hospitable to such strategic
litigation would be vigorous public record requests and litigation, if
necessary, to obtain data that would support arbitrariness allegations.
When litigators are fully informed of all relevant data they will be able to
evaluate whether strategic litigation really is a strategy likely to provide
any relief.
CONCLUSION
While voting rights advocates and litigators frequently find themselves
mired in frustration and failure in their battle to ensure that every Floridian,
even those who have been involved with the criminal justice system, is
afforded his or her constitutional right to vote, the battle is not lost.
Judicial rejections of facial challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws
do not mean that there are no tools left to resist disenfranchisement efforts.
By replacing broad legal challenges with advocacy and strategic litigation
approaches, felony disenfranchisement challengers might find themselves
with an enthusiastic base of grassroots support and with improvements in
the political exclusion of hundreds of thousands of Floridians.
106 Id. at 1962,
107 Id. at 1944-46.
108 Bryan Lee Miller and Joseph Spillane, Governing the Restoration of Civil Rights For Ex-
Felons: An Evaluation of the Executive Clemency Board in Florida, 15 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 413, 423-
24(2012).
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